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Abstract: Complexity and sophistication among multimedia-based tools have made it easy for
perpetrators to conduct digital crimes such as counterfeiting, modification, and alteration without
being detected. It may not be easy to verify the integrity of video content that, for example, has been
manipulated digitally. To address this perennial investigative challenge, this paper proposes the
integration of a forensically sound push button forensic modality (PBFM) model for the investigation
of the MP4 video file format as a step towards automated video forensic investigation. An open-source
multimedia forensic tool was developed based on the proposed PBFM model. A comprehensive
evaluation of the efficiency of the tool against file alteration showed that the tool was capable of
identifying falsified files, which satisfied the underlying assertion of the PBFM model. Furthermore,
the outcome can be used as a complementary process for enhancing the evidence admissibility of
MP4 video for forensic investigation.
Keywords: multimedia forensics; push button forensics; file signature alteration technique
1. Introduction
Information and communications technology (ICT) has taken over a substantial part
of our lives and has brought about changes in our daily lives. Furthermore, the digital
information that is stored in computers and multimedia devices is increasing, in particular
multimedia content such as images, audio, and video. Video is one of the most significant
groups of these multimedia data. However, as asserted in [1,2], the proliferation and ease
of falsification of this class of multimedia data present a daunting challenge to society, thus
further requiring the need for an advanced file fingerprinting mechanism [3,4]. Highlight-
ing this notion, Reference [5] posited that the trustworthiness of a multimedia video is
sacrosanct, the lack of a scientifically verifiable method notwithstanding. This challenge
can be attributed to the complexity of editing software, which has also evolved to enable
inexperienced users to manipulate the content of digital data (with little effort) with a
high-quality output. As a consequence, questions regarding media authenticity are of
growing significance, particularly in litigation where important decisions might be based
on the reliability of the digital evidence [6]. A proper chain of custody, as well as a chain of
evidence are also required to ensure the repeatability and possible expert presentation of a
digital artefact [6–8].
The digital forensics discipline—the field saddled with the application of proven
scientific methods to validate the reliability of digital artefacts [9,10]—has seen a steady
growth in the number of professionals capable of extracting and verifying the authenticity
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of multimedia data. Whilst this surge has been prevalent in developed countries where
digital crimes are thoroughly investigated, the same cannot be said for developing nations.
This is, however, conversely related to the reality of crime in the developing nations. Digital
criminals tend to leverage the availability of state-of-the-art software and criminal networks
to perpetuate seemingly sophisticated multimedia-related crimes. Therefore, a surge of fake
multimedia content tends to dominate the cyber-ecosystem of most developing countries
without a corresponding forensic/policing capability. Furthermore, the search for “better
pay” in a seemingly “privileged” discipline has led to the migration of digital forensic
experts from developing nations to advanced settings. Thus, the developing nations are
left with a declining ratio of forensic experts to cyber criminals. A potential approach to
this decreasing ratio is the integration of automation (a drive towards the bush button
approach) in the forensic investigation process.
However, the notion of automation has been observed to further present diverse
challenges, as asserted in [11], to include software and result verification challenges, the
tendency of over-reliance on a tool (which could result in partial analysis), as well as the
propensity to inhibit the soundness of the forensic process (given that the investigation
process would be an art rather than a science, at best). These concerns can be summarized
as the potential for a lack of reliability. Reliability in this regard involves both chain of cus-
tody and chain of evidence assurance. Attempts to address this automation challenge have
been further asserted to provide a basis for departmental digital investigation workload re-
duction, to promote knowledge retention, and as a means towards forensic standardization
and investigation coherence [11,12].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, the background of
this study, as well as related studies are given. This is followed by the method used to
realize the push button forensic concept, presented in Section 3. An implementation of the
proposed approach is further presented, in Section 4 which contains the developed push
button tool. Thereafter, a discussion is given in Section 5. The conclusion and future work
of the study are given in Section 6.
2. Background and Related Literature
Multimedia Forensics (MF) is a digital forensics sub-domain that applies scientific
techniques across a variety of digital content (audio, video, photo, etc.) for electronic
discovery [13,14]. Like computer forensics [15], it involves the discovery of the source
and/or location of multimedia data from their file metadata. Additionally, MF is tasked
with the extraction of useful information for authentication and identification; for example,
forgery detection, similarities between images, and the rate of accurate detection of multi-
media facets. Image forensics plays a vital role in proving the authenticity and integrity
of digital images by attempting to detect forgeries such as copy-move, copy-paste, region
duplication, forged region, and region replacement within an image [16]. Audio forensic
analysis, on the other hand, is the process of collecting, examining, and reviewing audio
recordings to extract facts that are admissible during litigation by a court of competent ju-
risdiction [17]. Audio forensics has several applications that could be linked to the acoustic
environment or location where the audio was recorded, the identification of speakers and
audio improvements, or the actual device used to record the audio file. Similarly, video
forensics aims to evaluate the authenticity and integrity of a moving image and integrated
audio stream (video content) through the analysis of inherent device characteristics or
processing artefacts in the video data [18]. Basically, MF focuses on source identification
and forgery detection. Whilst source identification focuses on identifying or inferring
knowledge about the source of digital information, forgery detection attempts to uncover
traces of falsification by assessing the authenticity of the digital content [19]. MF is able
to achieve this goal by relying on the extraction of facts and evidence to authenticate the
integrity of digital data [20]. Videos are made by converting a camera’s electrical impulses
and saving the information as digital media. The number of still images per video time
unit is referred to as the frame rate. Clips in digital videos use about 12–30 frame rates
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per second, with 24 frames per second as the widely used frame rate (frame/s). The
larger the number of frames, the smoother the video will appear. MP4 video, for instance,
uses a sequence of pictures (discrete pixels) that can be continuously viewed to create the
impression of motion, which manipulates the persistence of the perception of the human
pictorial system [21].
These pixels can easily be represented by a number that uniquely identifies its overall
value, which is easier for the computer to manipulate and store. Video falsification is a
process of malicious modification of digital video content to obscure an entity or an event
or change the meaning conveyed by the video; while video tampering detection aims to
discover the traces of alteration and thereby evaluate the trustworthiness and integrity of
the video file [22]. Insights into related studies on video forensics are further presented in
the next paragraphs.
A large volume of research has proposed techniques and methods to confirm the
trustworthiness and integrity of a digital video evidence. These techniques asserts that
modifying the content of a video introduces specific artefacts that could be used for the
alteration detection of a given video file. Detection techniques are classified as passive
(blind) and active techniques [23]. According to [24], the availability of low-cost electronic
multimedia devices and the high level of data processing capabilities have made video
forensics increasingly important. Nevertheless, Reference [24] focused on discrepancies in
video content using a human pictorial system through image resemblance measurement
to find modifications in videos. This technique could readily detect alterations that are
not noticeable to the human eye. The study in [25] reported that the accessibility of low-
cost, portable, and highly usable digital multimedia devices has significantly increased
the likelihood of location-less, network-related, or time-constrained digital multimedia.
As a consequence, the authentication and verification of a given content have become
increasingly difficult. The study further opined that this difficulty has several consequences
when the digital content is used as a corroborating piece of evidence.
Similarly, the study in [26] proposed a video copy recognition system that is based
on content fingerprinting that could also be used for the indexing and validation of video.
The system uses a fingerprint extraction algorithm combined with a fast and approximate
search algorithm to extract the compact content-based signatures from separate images
of the video frames. Each of such images represents a short segment of the video and
contains temporal, as well as spatial information about the video segment. The system
extracts and pre-stores fingerprints of all the videos stored in the database. However,
this approach only works for video with a very short length, thus making the approach
inefficient for forensic investigation purposes. By limiting the investigation process to
frame removals only, the study in [27] proposed a collection of automated frame removal
or additional recognition techniques that considered changes in the P-frame prediction
error of a video. This technique focuses on video codecs using a fixed-length group of
pictures (GOPs) when compressing segmented frames in a video. Moreover, the result is
only reliable if anti-forensics have not been applied to the video content. Leveraging the
signal processing methodology, the studies in [25,28] inspected the effective approaches to
reconstruct and authenticate the processing history of video data. The study asserted that
most alterations are not revocable and leave some “footprints” in the reconstructed signals,
which can be analysed to recognize the previous processing steps. However, empirical
evaluation has shown that simple processing chains of a signal can be reconstructed with a
negligible amount of modification to the signal, rendering the approach inefficient to check
the footprint of the video content.
In an attempt to introduce an automation process (referred to as push button forensics),
the study in [18] developed a system that explored the video stream of digital cameras and
mobile phones in order to extract the file format structures. Upon successful extraction,
the system then validated the structure with the original video file. Captured information
included the origin of the file, recognizing the true device of the acquisition model, and the
processing software that was used for the recording. Furthermore, it required an adapted
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file parser(s) to read and extract all obtainable file formats and metadata from the videos
in the database created. This approach is a passive technique of detecting alterations in
videos. The tendency to store all models or vendor-specific peculiarities of digital devices
used for creating video content was a major limitation of the study. A similar study in [22]
established a method for perceiving suspicious areas using noise characteristics in static
scene videos (surveillance).
A noise level function (NLF) describes the variance in image signals of the irradiance-
dependent noise. The study used a probabilistic design approach, which regulated the
noise characteristics at each pixel. Pixels in spliced areas were separated using the posterior
maximum (MAP) estimation of the noise model where the NLFs were incompatible with
the rest of the image. However, the study did not account for frame structures failure when
the repeated frames were less than the calculated window size, especially when frame
replication took place in a different order. Reference [29] also developed the VidentifierTM
(VTM) Forensic system for automatically recognizing the modification of images and videos.
VTM Forensic has two main features that are of interest to the multimedia community. First,
it has a robust structure, precisely distinguishing difficult video alterations. Secondly, it is
efficient, even on a very large scale. To recognize video modifications, VTM Forensic uses
a mixture of a large-scale multidimensional NV-tree index and fine-grained local image
descriptors. VTM Forensic is tolerant of many pictorial changes, including mirroring,
camrips, compression, and subtitles. It, however, requires that the fingerprints of the
authentic versions of the videos be stored in the database for assessment. The feasibility of
creating a valid database for all original versions of video files cannot be ensured during
a digital investigation. These studies attempted to develop viable alternatives for video
forensics, albeit with inherent limitations. Furthermore, the forensic soundness of the push
button forensic modality (PBFM) tools developed was ignored. To address these observed
limitations, the current research proposed a forensically sound push button forensic (PBFM)
tool for the investigation of the MP4 video file format. The file format selection hinged on a
limited number of potential video file formats and the possibility of an exhaustive video
file format integration.
3. Realising Push Button Forensics
As a step towards addressing this forensic reliability challenge, this study sought to
promote the development of an automated video forensics process through a push button
forensics modality (PBFM). The term PBFM is used to connote a forensically sound process
implemented in a tool for conducting digital investigation. This process mainly includes
corroborative evidence collection and pre-processing, as well as potential evidence analysis.
A typical PBFM process defined for this study is further illustrated in Figure 1. Central
to this illustration is the assurance of chain of custody and chain of evidence through a
white-box testing approach. The decision to ascertain these attributes was considered
essential for evidence admissibility and standardized forensic practice. Consequently, this
process can potentially “reduce the case backlog while avoiding investigation biases and
personal prejudice” [11]. Furthermore, the process considers the verification of the analysis
methodology. In this regard, a formal approach that entails theoretical suppositions and
logical reasoning can be used to substantiate the correctness of the analysis process.
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Figure 1. Push button forensics reliability assurance process.
3.1. Implementation Approaches
This section discusses the proposed PBFM approach, which is based on a file signature
alteration technique that is capable of identifying potential modifications. A multi-tier
architecture (n-tier), which is comprised of the presentation, logical, and data tiers, as
shown in Figure 2, was adopted in this study. This architecture physically separates the
application logic processing, data management roles, and presentation activities.
The presentation tier, as shown in Figure 2, which is the uppermost layer of the appli-
cation, interconnects with the other two tiers of the application. It shows the data of the
administered output content and the layer that users access through the graphical user
interface (GUI). The logic tier (application tier, middle tier, or business logic) receives input
from the presentation tier. It processes and controls the functionalities of the proposed
application. On the other hand, the data storage tier is the data access layer that encapsu-
lates the persistence mechanisms and exposes the data to the application tier. The storage
mechanism allows for updates or changes without affecting the application tier clients.
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Figure 2. Multi-tier architecture.
3.2. Operational Framework
One core component of an automated forensics process, as highlighted in Figure 1,
is the capability to ensure white-box testing. The combination of the tiered architecture
and the process presented in Figure 3 was conceived of to address this focus. This fur-
ther ensures that the software information domain and its component functions are fully
understood, as are its behaviour, performance, and the interfaces required. An imputed
Mp4 Video file is parsed for file signature identification and extraction. The extraction
signature is then compared with a known signature. The report of this verification pro-
cess is further hashed to ensure integrity verification. These are further explained in the
following subsections.
Figure 3. Operational framework.
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3.2.1. Signature Extraction Mechanism
Tracing the forgery of a video file requires the identification of several parameters
of the video file. Mostly, it becomes paramount for one to be able to prove that the
file is a video file or whether there exists any enhancements or illegal processing using
video processing tools. Figure 3 shows the flow of the video selection process. The file
selection process identifies video-type media files, which is further verified to ascertain
if the imputed sample is an accurate file format. The format in this context denotes the
standard extension that identifies the file type. Upon successful identification of the
desired file format, the data is parsed to the file signature extraction and comparison phase.
Identification and extraction of the signature of a file comprise a forensic scheme that is
performed at the preliminary stages, which allows one to match the content of the file
against what may be residing in the database. A rather interesting concept in this approach
is to identify the accidental or deliberate distortions or tampering. The file signature, in
the context of this research, is identified as a key feature of video file. This is based on the
supposition that each video file format has a specific frame content that corresponds to a
unique hexadecimal value, otherwise known as its file signature. Known file signatures
can, therefore, be stored in the repository. In the authors’ in-depth analysis, distortions of
the video signatures may arbitrarily hinder successful forensic discoveries. The theoretical
basis and the corresponding algorithm for the signature extraction and comparison are
presented in Section 3.2.2. Upon a successful match (or the converse), a corresponding
forensic report is generated.
3.2.2. File Signature Identification and Extraction from MP4 Video
The MP4 video format (MPEG-4 Section 14, also known as MPEG-4 AVC, where AVC
denotes Advanced Video Coding and MPEG refers to Motion Picture Expert Group) is one
of the most common digital multimedia formats for storing video and audio. However, it
can also be used to store other data such as subtitles and still images. The official file name
extension for MPEG-4 Part 14 files is “.mp4”, other extensions, most commonly “.m4a” and
“.m4p”, notwithstanding. MP4 is based on the ISO/IEC 14496-12:2004 standard, which in
turn is based on the QuickTime file format. Its structure is similar to the QuickTime file
format, with some additional features. An MP4 file has three sections: header (ftyp), video
data (mdat), index information (moov), as shown in Figure 4. Furthermore, the MP4 format
also consists of consecutive chunks. Each chunk of MP4 files includes an 8 byte header, a
4 byte chunk size (high byte first, big-endian), and a 4 byte chunk type. The hexadecimal
composition of these chunks is further depicted in Figure 5. The first chunk of an MP4 file
has a four byte chunk size at offset zero and a four byte chunk type.
Figure 4. MP4 file structure.
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Figure 5. First chunk of a sample MP4 file.
From Figure 5, the offset locations 00 through 03 represent the size in a decimal value
of the first chunk header. To extract the file signature, the hexadecimal values 00 00 00 18
are converted to decimal values, which correspond to 00 00 00 24. This is the size of the first
chunk header in the sample MP4 file shown in Figure 4. The offset locations 04 through 07
represent the signature type (66 74 79 70) of the first chunk header of an MP4 file. These
hexadecimal values are converted to ASCII values to obtain “ftyp”. ftyp represents the first
file signature type for every MP4 file, with details further depicted in Table 1.
Table 1. Signature type of MP4 files.
Hexadecimal Decimal ASCII
66 74 79 70 102 116 121 112 ftyp
Furthermore, the first chunk of every MP4 file also has a signature sub-type defined
at offset locations 08 through 11. When these hexadecimal values are converted to their
corresponding ASCII values, one of the following signature sub-types is obtained: “avc1”,
“iso2”, “isom”, “mmp4”, “mp41”, “mp42”, “mp71”, “msnv”, “ndas”, “ndsc”, “ndsh”,
“ndsm”, “ndsp”, “ndss”, “ndxc”, “ndxh”, “ndxm”, “ndxp”, “ndxs”.
A summary of these signature sub-types is further presented in Table 2. The offset
location of the second chunk starts at the size defined by the first chunk. It has a four byte
chunk size and a four byte chunk type. A breakdown of the file signature subtype using
the second chunk is also considered. This is further illustrated in Figure 6.
From Figure 6, offset locations 00 through 03 (00 00 00 18) represent the size (24 in
decimals) of the first chunk header. Thus, offset location 24 marks the start point of the
second chunk. From the sampled MP4 file shown in Figure 6, offset locations 24 through 27
(00 00 24 CD) represent the size (9421 in decimals) of the second chunk. The next four bytes
after the size represent the file signature type of the second chunk. These file signature
types could be any of the types shown in Table 3.
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Table 2. Signature sub-type of MP4 files.
S/N ASCII Hexadecimal Decimal
1 avc1 61 76 63 31 097 118 099 049
2 iso2 69 73 6F 32 105 115 111 050
3 isom 69 73 6F 6D 105 115 111 109
4 mmp4 6D 6D 70 34 109 109 112 052
5 mp41 6D 70 34 31 109 112 052 049
6 mp42 6D 70 34 32 109 112 052 050
7 mp71 6D 70 37 31 109 112 055 049
8 msnv 6D 73 6E 76 109 115 110 118
9 ndas 6E 64 61 73 110 100 097 115
10 ndsc 6E 64 73 63 110 100 115 099
11 ndsh 6E 64 73 68 110 100 115 104
12 ndsm 6E 64 73 6D 110 100 115 109
13 ndsp 6E 64 73 70 110 100 115 112
14 ndss 6E 64 73 73 110 100 115 115
15 ndxc 6E 64 78 63 110 100 120 099
16 ndxh 6E 64 78 68 110 100 120 104
17 ndxm 6E 64 78 6D 110 100 120 109
18 ndxp 6E 64 78 70 110 100 120 112
19 ndxs 6E 64 78 73 110 100 120 115
Figure 6. Second chunk of the sample MP4 file structure.
The offset locations 16 through 19 and 20 through 23 are also considered a file signature
sub-type, which could be defined by any of the signatures in the MP4 signature sub-type
shown in Table 3.
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Table 3. MP4 signature types.
S/N ASCII Hexadecimal Decimal
1 ftyp 66 74 79 70 102 116 121 112
2 mdat 6D 64 61 74 109 100 097 116
3 moov 6D 6F 6F 76 109 111 111 118
4 pnot 70 6E 6F 74 112 110 111 116
5 udta 75 64 74 61 117 100 116 097
6 uuid 75 75 69 64 117 117 105 100
7 moof 6D 6F 6F 66 109 111 111 102
8 free 66 72 65 65 102 114 101 101
9 skip 73 6B 69 70 115 107 105 112
10 jP2 6A 50 32 106 080 050
11 wide 77 69 64 65 119 105 100 101
12 load 6C 6F 61 64 108 111 097 100
13 ctab 63 74 61 62 099 116 097 098
14 imap 69 6D 61 70 105 109 097 112
15 matt 6D 61 74 74 109 097 116 116
16 kmat 6B 6D 61 74 107 109 097 116
17 clip 63 6C 69 70 099 108 105 112
18 crgn 63 72 67 6E 099 114 103 110
19 sync 73 79 6E 63 115 121 110 099
20 chap 63 68 61 70 099 104 097 112
21 tmcd 74 6D 63 64 116 109 099 100
22 scpt 73 63 70 74 115 099 112 116
23 ssrc 73 73 72 63 115 115 114 099
24 PICT 50 49 43 54 080 073 067 084
To determine the offset location of the third chunk for the MP4 sample file shown in
Figures 5 and 6, the size of the first chunk is added to the size of the second chunk. In this
case, the first and second chunk sizes are 24 and 9421 (both in decimals), respectively. Thus,
the offset location of the third chunk is 24 + 9421 = 9445. Therefore, the offset locations 9445
through 9448 represent the size of the third chunk, while the offset locations 9449 through
9452 represent the file signature type of the chunk as defined in the file signature type table
shown in Table 3. A summary depiction of the third chunk is shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7. Third chunk of a sample MP4 file.
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3.3. Comparison Lookup Table
To aid the comparison process, this study developed a lookup table, which was then
used to compute the authentication process of the file format structure and file signature
based on the alteration differences typically observed between an altered file and its original
version. A synopsis of the lookup sequence is further presented in Table 4. The sequence is
an integration of the defined file signature sub-types for chunks 1, 2, and 3.
Table 4. Signature comparison lookup table.
S/N Chunk Offset Size Type Sub-type
1 Chunk 1 0 size-1 ftyp Table 3
2 Offset-x 16–19 Table 2 NIL
3 Offset-y 20–23 Table 2 NIL
4 Chunk 2 size-1 size-2 Table 2 NIL
5 Chunk 3 size (1 + 2) size-3 Table 2 NIL
The sequence synopsis given in Table 4 is further described as follows:
• Chunk: the chunk header information represents the order in which the chunk appears
in the file, where chunk 1, chunk 2, and chunk 3 depict the first, second, and third
chunks of the examined MP4 file, respectively.
• Offset: an offset depicts the distance from the beginning of the file (when viewed in
Hex format) where “0” is the index position zero and “size-1” is the index position of
the first size of the chunk observed in the examined MP4 file.
• Size: the size depicts the computed decimal value equivalent of the chunk’s size,
which consists of four octets.
• Type: this depicts a predefined signature used for the identification of each chunk.
• Sub-type: this depicts a predefined signature for identifying the sub-chunks of every
chunk within the examined MP4 file.
4. Push Button Forensic Tool
A web-based video forensic tool, which provides the basic forensic functionality that
is required for video forensic investigation, is presented in this section. Based on com-
mon practice in forensic examination, the developed system provides basic functionalities
such as determining the video file format; identifying whether the video file has been
manipulated or not; and identifying the manipulation/alteration techniques. The corre-
sponding interface of the developed tool is shown in Figure 8 (the tool is available at
https://github.com/mrzee498/Multimedia-Forensicator (accessed on 5 March 2021)). The
tool uses a lightweight database as the storage location where the comparison mechanism
gets a stored set of file signatures of the existing video format. Based on the various actions
highlighted as the processes involving data input, different tables were designed to help
store the information needed for such actions.
The user (forensic investigator) starts by choosing the type of multimedia file (in
this case video) to be investigated. After a successful upload of the multimedia file, the
user then performs the analysis by “pushing” the “Forensic Analysis” “button” shown
in Figure 8. The result of the verification/authentication process is then displayed. The
interpretation of the result is presented in Table 5.
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Figure 8. Result of analysis of MP4 file using the PBF tool.
Table 5. Description of the interpretation of the output of the tool.
S/N Attribute Description
1 File type specifies the type of multimedia file that is beinginvestigated; in our case, video
2 Format specifies the file format of the multimedia file that wasselected from the file type.
3 Name shows the name of the file as stored in thesource location
4 Size this is the size of the uploaded mp4video filein kilobytes
5 Status Report shows whether its integrity has beencompromised or not
5. Discussion
The increasing rate of multimedia devices and the demand for digital data call for a
scientific and forensically proven approach to verify the authenticity of digital evidence
presented in video content. This is necessary because forensic analysis plays an important
role in criminal investigations and civil litigation cases when administered in a court of
law. Forensic practitioners have researched several techniques and methods to verify
the trustworthiness and integrity of the content of a digital video [23]. Some of the tools
developed use different alteration detection techniques to authenticate digital video con-
tent, and examples of such tools include: the VidentifierTM (VTM) Forensic system for
automatically identifying modification in images and videos, developed by Asmundsson
and Lejsek [29]. The method used by VTM is a fingerprint-based extraction unit associated
with the database server where the geometric and time-based properties of the extracted
fingerprints are stored. The system requires that the fingerprints of the authentic videos be
obtained and stored in the database to be used for assessing videos under investigation.
However, a priori knowledge of digital content may not be available for forensic investiga-
tion. Therefore, this proves a limitation in the VTM forensic system given that obtaining
the authentic version of all available video files may prove challenging.
Secondly, the study in [25] developed an approach to reconstruct and authenticate
the processing history of video data. The study assumed that alterations are not revocable
and that they leave some evidence in the reconstructed signals, which can be analysed to
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recognize the previous processing steps. However, according to [28], simple processing
chains of a signal can be reconstructed without adding an excessive amount of modification
to the signal, thus rendering the approach inefficient to check the integrity of the video
content. The study in [27] proposed a collection of automated frame removals. This system
achieved video authentication with a mathematical model of video frame removal and
accumulation discovery techniques aimed at video codecs using a fixed length group of
pictures (GOP) when compressing segmented video frames. The limitation of the outcome
is that the method is only reliable if anti-forensic techniques have not been applied to the
video content. Similarly, the study in [18] developed a passive technique of alteration
detection that explores video streams and extracts file format structures of the videos from
multimedia devices. The approach is based on recognizing the true device of the acquisition
model or the processing software that was used for the recording and required adapted
file parser(s) to read and extract all obtainable file formats’ data and metadata from videos.
Detecting video file structure information based on camera and mobile phone model
specifics may not be effective in the future, because determining all models or vendor-
specific peculiarities of digital devices used for creating video content is challenging.
Lastly, the study in [30] proposed an algorithm for detecting frame deletion in HEVC-
coded videos that were classified by machine learning classifiers. The research employed
the passive alteration detection technique of multimedia forensic methods. Results from
the study revealed that learning-based classifiers were more efficient than model-based
ones. Furthermore, the system had a limitation in forgery detection capabilities when the
number of deleted frames doubled the number of groups of pictures (GOPs) in digital
videos. This implies that videos falsified by experienced anti-forensic individuals will
lure the system to a false negative report. A descriptive summary of these tools is further
presented in Table 6.
While several tools have been developed with different alteration detection tech-
niques, as reflected in the comparative analysis in Table 6, the file signature method of the
active authentication technique as considered in this study presents a white-box paradigm.
Authentication is used loosely, in this regard, to refer to the process of identifying and
validating the file signature of the given MP4 file using the baseline Hex structure as the sig-
nature. This technique is considered the most effective of all the approaches examined [22].
It involves the process of extracting the unique digital structure of the file signature embed-
ded at the point when video files are created. Moreover, altering the file in any manner
deteriorates the embedded signature [21]. Furthermore, the white-box paradigm ensures
that the reliability of the forensic process can be evaluated. This study did not presume
any prior knowledge of the authentic versions of the video files under investigation, unlike
other studies that attempted to extract fingerprints from the original versions of the videos.
Furthermore, this study did not rely on the architectural structures of the file formats only
or the acquisition devices, because anti-forensic techniques can falsify the structure and
source of digital content, as proven in previous studies.
These studies applied diverse video alteration techniques, which can be summarized
as frame insertion, frame deletion, frame and header substitution, metadata alteration, and
header information alteration. Furthermore, video editing tools such as Hex editor, Adobe
Premiere Pro (for timeline-based video editing), Freemaker video converter, Windows
movie maker, EZGif, movie maker, Corel VideoStudio Ultimate, Magix Movie Edit Pro,
OpenShot (available at https://www.openshot.org/ (accessed on 5 March 2021)), Atube
catcher, Camtasia studio, and Adobe Spark are potential tools that can be explored to falsify
video content. Recent advances that explore the deep learning approach in image alteration
are also applicable. To further evaluate the effectiveness of the developed tool, Adobe
Premiere Pro, Atube catcher, and Windows movie maker were used to perform MP4 file
alteration. Three MP4 files were altered and then verified using the developed tool. The
result, as shown in Table 7, supports the theoretical supposition presented in this study.
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Table 6. Comparative analysis MP4 file forensic analysis.
Video
Forensic Tool Approach Results Limitation Analysis
Proposed
Active detection technique
using the file signature
method.
Efficient and works
accurately for both large and
small size videos in MP4
format. Detects forgeries
irrespective of the alteration
technique.
It works only for MP4
video files
Although MP4 is a widely used format
for presenting videos, it is not the only
format available. The system is
accurate only when the source devices
use the MP4 format at the point of
creation.
[29] Finger-print-basedextraction.





prior knowledge of the
original version of the
digital content under
investigation.
Obtaining the original versions of
digital videos for investigation is quite
challenging. An effective forensic tool
should confirm the integrity of digital
content without any prior knowledge




techniques to extract from
the multi-camera system
the trajectories of moving
people to create a video
forensic authentication tool.
Effective in retrieving people
snapshot and trajectory





chains of signals with
the assumption that no
excessive amount of
modifications was made.
Reconstructing processing chains of
signals leave some forensically
detectable traces in the reconstructed
signals, which can be analysed to
render the data forensically
contaminated.
[27]
Frame forgery detection of
the multimedia passive
authentication technique.
The developed system can
automatically detect video
forgeries with a high degree
of accuracy if anti-forensics is
not used.




There are other numerous anti-forensic
techniques (such as region shuffling,
frame duplication, camera source
forgery, etc.) that can be applied to
digital videos aside frame deletion and














only the passive method
of multimedia forensic
analysis.
The system fails to authenticate digital
















robust and reliable than
model-based classifiers.
The system remains robust only for
in-frame deletion scenarios involving
static scenes and effortlessly
manipulated videos. While the system
is only limited to frame deletion
situations, anti-forensic methods could
fool the system and render the
authentication process abortive if other
alteration techniques are employed.
The verification process presented in Table 7 shows that signature mismatch can be
used to distinguish altered files irrespective of the alteration techniques applied. This study
therefore presented the background for a reliable approach towards a PBFM platform.
Such a platform is essential to address the growing deficit of skill shortage in developing
nations. It is needless to highlight that the exodus of forensic experts from most developing
nations, as well as the corresponding lack of competent forensic examiners could pose a
consequential challenge to the global forensics community. The proposed tool, however,
provides a fundamental basis for the admissibility and reliability of forensic artefacts,
more specifically, complying with the reliability assurance process stated in Figure 1.
Furthermore, there is a constant need to incorporate cost-savings mechanisms (forensic
readiness) when it comes to digital forensics, which in the context of this study may
be useful to an organization. This basically allows incidental planning as a solution of
getting evidence when needed in order to reconstruct an event [31,32]. Additionally, the
automation process of the tool ensures that every action taken by the user while using
the tool is logged, and the resultant output of the analysis is carefully documented with
a corresponding hash digest for both the logs and the analysis result. Through this, the
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result of the automation process can be verified by another examiner, when required, as
asserted in [11,33].
Table 7. Tool validation using off-the-shelf file alteration tools.
S/N Alteration Tool Applied Technique Obtained Result
1 Windows Movie Maker Frame deletion
• File Format: VALID
• Digital Signature: NOT VALID
• STATUS Report: Some frames were removed
from the original copy
2 Windows Movie Maker Frame Replacement
• File Format: VALID
• Digital Signature: NOT VALID
• STATUS Report: The video is a valid mp4 file,
but the DIGITALsignature is not verified
3 Adobe Premier Pro Copy Paste Frames
• File Format: VALID
• Digital Signature: NOT VALID
• STATUS Report: The video is a valid mp4 file,
but the DIGITAL signature is not verified
4 Adobe Premier Pro Copy Paste Frames
• File Format: VALID
• Digital Signature: NOT VALID
• STATUS Report: The video is a valid mp4 file,
but the DIGITAL signature is not verified
5 Atube Catcher Frame Conversion
• File Format: VALID
• Digital Signature: NOT VALID
• STATUS Report: The frames are converted from
another format
6 Atube Catcher Frame Compression
• File Format: VALID
• Digital Signature: NOT VALID
• STATUS Report: The video is a valid mp4 file,
but the DIGITAL signature is not verified
6. Conclusions and Future Works
This study presented a technique for verifying MP4 video data integrity by authen-
ticating the embedded digital signature. It also showed that the authentication of digital
data is not strictly based on complex mathematics and algorithms. A video file can be
authenticated by understanding the file structures and decoding the embedded digital
signature at the point of creation. This research work presented a method for authenticating
MP4 videos by creating a lookup table for the architectural structure and composition
of the content. The developed system is a useful tool for digital investigations that will
provide a simple user interface for multimedia forensics investigators. While this study
did not provide an exhaustive lookup table of all possible video file formats, further study
is currently under way to include all potentially available video file formats, as well as
other multimedia file types in the developed tool. The tools was further conceptualized
to provide a baseline for the development of push button forensics capable of enhancing
forensics investigation in developing nations. Future work will also include other video
file formats and the use of combined alteration detection techniques to make the tool more
robust and sophisticated to span across various anti-forensic techniques.
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